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to reduce this to [...] 1350 hours by 2005. “
Gennun government employment reports (Senatsvetvaltung fir Arbeit und Frauen 1995a,b)
There is a wide-spread popular belief that unemployment can be reduced by reducing the
number of hours worked per person. The reasoning is usually based on what is sometimes
called the “lump of work fallacy”: labor input is seen as fixed, and it is believed that if each
worker works fewer hours, this work can be spread over more workers, and employment will
rise. This is known as work-sharing. However, if restrictions on hours make labor less
attractive to employers, they will substitute to other inputs, and there will also be a scale effect
reducing use of all inputs
Interest in work-sharing resurfaces periodically in different countries, and has been
particularly high in Europe in recent years, following the rise in unemployment since the
mid- 1970s. The tool of choice in Europe for the reduction of working hours is a reduction in
the standard work week: that is, a reduction in the number of hours beyond which an overtime
premium must be paid. The French and Belgian governments mandated reductions in the
standard work week in the 1980s, while German unions have achieved more far-reaching
reductions on an industry by industry basis. In 1996 the French government is threatening to
reduce standard hours further from the current 39 if employers and unions do not agree amongst
themselves to do so. In the United States mandated overtime premia have been preferred as an
inducement to work-sharing (the 50% premium is higher than typical premia in Europe), but the
1AFL-CIO in 1996 began a campaign for a 32-hour 4-day work week. The use of standard hours
as an hours-reducing tool introduces further ambiguity into the theoretical problem, however,
since employers have the option of shifting to using more overtime.
Most studies of reductions in standard hours have relied on aggregate time series, where
the effect of falling standard hours could be confounded with the effect of another variable
trending down. In this paper I take advantage of the industry level variation in standard hours
reductions in (West) Germany to identify the impact on employment, focusing particularly on
the 1980s. The reductions began with the metal-working and printing sectors in 1985, where
standard hours fell in steps from 40 to 37 between 1984 and 1989. Most other sectors had a
smaller reduction beginning later, while some sectors had no reductions in this period.
Only one econometric study of this episode has been carried out, a study using aggregate
time-series. I use data on 201 manufacturing industries to look at employment directly, and
individual-level data on all industries from the German Socio-Economic Panel to examine layoff
probabilities. Employer-initiated changes in employment stem from changes in hiring or layoff
rates, so at least one part of the process may be examined at a micro-level (hiring rates are
harder to study with individual data).
My results provide a less positive assessment of work-sharing than most of the existing
literature. Industry and individual level data indicate that employment increased by 0.3-0.7%
for hourly workers (Arbeiter) and by 0.2-0.3% for salaried workers (Angestellten) in response
to a one hour fall in standard hours. However, the implied aggregate employment rise of at
most 1.1% from 1984-89 is small compared with the U.S. employment growth over the same
period (7.3% growth in the employment to population ratio), which is arguably the target for
2the slower German employment growth (3.2% growth in the employment to population ratio).
Furthermore, reductions in standard hours led to large falls in total hours worked, and hence
possibly output losses: a one hour reduction in standard hours was associated with a 2-3% fall
in worker-hours for hourly-paid workers. Workers as a whole did appear to gain from the hours
reductions, however, as the wage bill rose for both hourly-paid and salaried workers. The first
phase of work-sharing thus apparently worked in the sense that employment rose and workers
as a group gained in terms of income and leisure. But employment did not rise enough to
redress Germany’s employment growth problem, and the large falls in worker-hours suggest that
output losses may have occurred. Results for the 1990-94 period are more pessimistic.
Hours Reductions in Gennuny
Unions in Germany bargain at the industry level, and conditions of union contracts apply
not only to members, but to almost all other workers as well. Amual hours may be reduced
either by increasing holiday time or by reducing standard weekly hours. By 1975 the prevailing
conditions were 40 hours per week and 30 days amual leave, and by 1981 95% of workers had
a standard working week of 40 hours’. The metal workers’ union, IG Metall, which along with
the printing union IG Druck had spearheaded earlier reductions in weekly hours, struck
unsuccessfully in 1978-9 to reduce standard weekly hours below 40. Other unions, such as IG
Chemie, the chemical union, focused on reducing life-time hours by reducing the retirement age.
IG Metall resumed its demands in 1982-3, and was successful after a protracted strike in early
1984. The declared aim of the hours reductions was a reduction in unemployment through
3work-sharing. Hours in the metal-working sector (employing almost four million workers) were
reduced to 38.5 in 1985.
A key element of the agreement, upon which agreements in many other sectors were
modelled, was the concession to employers of greater flexibility in the use of standard hours.
In particular,
could in fact
standard hours no longer had to be spread evenly over each day of the week, and
vary from week to week as long as they averaged to the agreed number over a
certain number of months. 2 Also, standard hours could vary across employees as long as they
averaged to the agreed number. It is important to note that the implementation of flexibility is
a matter to be negotiated at the plant level between the management and the works council, and
surveys have found that the majority of plants, particularly small plants, have not taken
advantage of the flexibility provisions (Bosch et. al. 1988).
A further issue to be resolved by management and works councils is the method of
implementation of the reduced standard week. Some firms reduced hours on Thursdays and
Fridays, some reduced the hours of each weekday by an equal amount, while others reduced
hours by awarding workers days off. Bosch (1990) reports that, initially, capital-intensive
industries preferred days off, while labor intensive industries reduced weekly or daily hours.
As the standard work week fell further, however, the number of days off to be allocated became
too great to be efficient, and the move to a reduction in daily hours (or a mixture of reduction
in hours and days of~ became more generalized.
Finally, certain union agreements recommended caps on overtime (or the compensation
of some overtime with days of~ to prevent the substitution of overtime hours for standard hours.
4This is again something to be implemented at the plant level by the works council and
management, and is obviously potentially important for work-sharing.
The agreement in the metal-working sector and the simultaneous agreement in the
printing sector were followed by more and more manufacturing and service industries over the
subsequent years. IG Metall itself in two later agreements negotiated further step-wise
reductions in standard hours, which have recently culminated (October 1995) in the 35-hour
week. IG Metall has announced that it seeks further reductions. Average standard hours
worked fell from 40.0 in 1984 to 38.8 in 1989 to 37.7 in 1994 (IAB 1995). In 1990 actual
annual hours per worker were 10% lower in Germany than in the U.S. (Bell and Freeman
1995).3
The agreements reached concerning standard hours often extend over a period of several
years, involving step-wise falls in hours, while wages typically continue to be renegotiated each
year. In most cases the unions announced that they had achieved their aim of “full wage
compensation”, meaning that weekly or monthly earnings (without overtime) were not reduced
despite the hours reductions (which implies a rise in the hourly straight-time wage). Hunt (1996)
finds that in the period 1984-89 this did in fact occur, so that monthly pay for workers working
the standard week did not fall in industries with standard hours reductions, relative to other
industries.
5~eoq
Consider a firm taking standard hours (h,), hourly wages (w) and the rental rate of capital
(r) as given, and choosing actual hours per worker (h), employment (N) and capital (K) in the
presence of fixed costs of employment (~, and an overtime premium (p):
‘h~~ g(hfl,fl - whN -P -pw(h -h,)N - rK (1)
Assume that this firm chooses non-zero overtime hours (h> ~), due to a high fixed cost of
employment f, Consider now an exogenous reduction in standard hours, which due to the
overtime premium increases labor costs. There will be a scale effect, tending to reduce
employment and hours per week, and a substitution effect from labor services to capital.
Worker-hours thus fall unambiguously. Substitution between hours per worker and workers is
made clearer by considering the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker (MC~) and the




Clearly the marginal cost of additional overtime is unaffected by standard hours (and is
determined only by the wage and the overtime premium), while the marginal cost of an
additional worker is increased when standard hours are reduced, since more of this worker’s
wages must be paid at the overtime premium. Hence, the firm will substitute from workers to
hours, an effect which obviously tends to decrease employment. Figure la shows the two
marginal cost schedules for original standard hours ho and reduced standard hours h,l. This case
is that of a firm originally having optimal hours such as h.’. Employment will therefore fall,and the effect on weekly hours depends upon whether the scale effect and substitution from labor
to capital dominates the substitution from workers to hours.
Figure la makes clear, however, that the original optimal hours (and the magnitude of
the standard hours reduction) are critical for the response of the firm along the worker-hours
margin. Consider a firm whose optimal hours are below even the new standard hours, at h+b.
If we assume that the law constrains hours to be at least standard hours, this firm will move its
actual hours from the original kink point ~“ to the new kink point &l. MC~ has thus not
changed, while MC~ has fallen, and the firm will substitute from hours to workers, the opposite
of the previous case. The scale effect and the capital-labor substitution effect will work to
increase employment. The overall effect is that hours will fall, while employment will rise.
We could extend the analysis to cases permitting firms to work less than standard hours
(since this is possible in Germany, albeit not on a permanent basis). If a firm’s original hours
are below both the new and old standard, as
not affect its behavior. If its original hours
in htb in Figure la, the fall in standard hours will
are above the new standard hours, workers-hours
substitution will depend on all the magnitudes involved (while scale and capital-labor substitution
effects will tend to lower employment and hours).
For the firm with original optimal hours h.’, the response to a fall in standard hours is
different if we allow the overtime premium to be a positive function of the number of overtime
hours. Many German industry contracts specify a 25% premium for the first ten overtime hours
per week or two overtime hours per
is also at a higher premium. If the
day, and a higher premium thereafter, and weekend work
fall in standard hours means the firm’s current hours are
now in the higher premium zone, as in Figure lb, the MC~may rise more than the MC~, and
7the firm will substitute from hours to workers. The net effect on employment will be
ambiguous, and hours will fall.4
These cases make clear that if employment is to rise, there must be a large substitution
from hours to workers. The finding that actual hours fall a lot is a necessary condition for
work-sharing to be effective, but it is not a sufficient condition, since actual hours may be falling
due to the scale effect or substitution to capital.
It is important to consider that other parameters might change in response to the reduction
in standard hours. The overt concession in exchange for shorter standard hours on the part of
German unions was the introduction of greater flexibility. Presumably flexibility has a positive
scale effect, but it may be complementary with capital, and its effect on the trade-off between
workers and hours must be examined in a more complex model.
Another consideration important for Germany is that the hourly (straight-time) wage
apparently increased in response to standard hours deductions. A wage increase would cause
a substitution from hours to workers due to the fixed cost of hiring a worker. 5 The net effect
on hours per worker is therefore negative, and on employment is ambiguous, although we would
usually expect the scale effect and substitution to capital to predominate and lower employment,
Worker-hours will fall.6
Finally, it is possible that individuals are more productive when they work fewer hours.
Lower actual hours thus induce capital-saving technological progress. This has an ambiguous
effect on the already ambiguous employment response, but should lead to a larger fall (or lower
rise) in actual hours. Worker-hours still fall.
8Previous Empirical Work
A number of papers use aggregate manufacturing times series data to look at the effect
of standard hours on actual hours per worker and employment, including Franz and Konig
(1986), who examine Germany from 1964-84, an earlier period of reduction in standard hours.
They report that a 1% reduction in standard hours raises employment by 1.09% and reduces
hours per worker by 0.99 %, which implies a slight rise in worker-hours. De Regt (1988) finds
an employment elasticity of -O.41 for the Netherlands in @e period 1954-82, and an hours per
worker elasticity of 0.89, implying a fall in worker-hours. Hart and Sharot (1978) find almost
identical results for UK males in the period 1961-72. Wadhwani (1987) and Faini and
Schiantarelli (1985) similarly estimate employment elasticities of -0.5, although they do not
estimate hours per worker elasticities. Brunello (1989), examining Japan in the period 1973-86,
finds a different result: that reducing standard hours has essentially no effect on actual hours,
although the employment elasticity is -0.34, thus implying a rise in worker-hours.
Hart (1987) uses pooled data for 25 German industries for 1969-81 and finds no response
of employment to standard hours, but that a 1% reduction in standard hours reduces hours per
worker (corrected for short time) by 1.2%. The variation in standard hours in this pooled
specification comes from both the cross-section and time-series. The only paper to examine
these issues using micro-data is Hart and Wilson (1988), which uses British firm-level data
pooled for the period 1978-82. They also find no response of employment to standard hours,
but find that a one hour reduction in standard hours reduces actual hours by 0.77 hours.
None of these papers describes the variation in standard hours that identifies the
coefficient of interest. With the time-series studies, standard hours may in many cases
9essentially be a downward trend, and may proxy for omitted variables that are also falling over
time. Hart (1987) and Hart and Wilson (1988) use more suitable data, but the effect of pooling
time-series and cross-section observations is unclear - the use of a panel technique would have
been preferable.
Evidence on employment effects of the German standard hour reductions since 1984 is
not abundant. Using full-time workers in the GSOEP, Hunt (1996) finds that hours per worker
fell by 0.85-1 hour for each hour fall in standard hours. A necessary condition for employment
to rise is therefore satisfied. However, a second finding, that straight-time hourly wages rose
2-3% for each hour reduction in standard hours, would work to reduce employment.
Stille and Zwiener (1987) attempt to tease out the effects of the 1985 standard hours
reduction in the metal-working sector by examining aggregate trends for that sector without
regression analysis. They judge that weekly overtime per person rose by half an hour due to
the standard hours reduction of 1.5 hours and that short time was unaffected by reductions in
standard hours, and influenced only by the business cycle. Their employment figures imply an
elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours of about -0.5, which lies between the
elasticities found by the employers’ association and the union. These results imply that worker-
hours stayed about the same. Finally, in the only econometric study of employment, Lehment
(1991) finds that when wage restraint is controlled for, reductions in standard hours are
insignificant in aggregate time series modelling employment growth for 1973-90.
10Data
The principal data used are industry level data on manufacturing from the Statistisches
Bundesamt. Firms with at least twenty employees are required to report certain information to
the statistical office at the end of each month. The
belonging to these firms. The variables available are
data used here refer to establishments
employment and wage bills for hourly
workers (Arbeiter) and salaried
worked) for Arbeiter, and sales.
workers (Angestellten) separately,
Data are for 201 industries (a small
to problems with their data). Attention is focused on the first phase
1984 to 1989, although some results are presented for 1990-94
classification changes).
worker-hours (total hours
number were excluded due
of hours reductions from
(after 1994 the industry
‘Indices of collectively bargained wages (the average by industry for Arbeiter and
Angestellten) are available from the same source. However, these data are available only
quarterly, and have a different and more aggregated industry classification (45 categories), which
must be matched to that used for the rest of the data. Collectively bargained wages rather than
actual wages are used because the desired variable is the straight-time wage. Average actual
wages would include overtime pay, and hence confound wages and hours. Collectively
bargained wages are also slightly more exogenous to the firm, as there exists a certain amount
of wage drift (raising of wages above the collectively bargained floor).
Published standard hours by industry are obtained from tables supplied by the WSI
(Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts des Deutschen Gewerkschaftbundes) (Hans-
Bockler-Stiftung 1995). In certain industries where standard hours vary by region, the average
across regions (weighted by employment) is computed.
11Figure 2 shows the means of the industry-level variables used.’ The means are
unweighed, which means that compared to aggregate patterns, small industries are
overrepresented. This appears to make average employment growth in the sample lower than
in the aggregate (although aggregate manufacturing employment did fall 1986-7). The spikes
in the Arbeiter wage bill series are due to end of year bonuses. Figure 3 selects four industries
to represent the variety of standard hours reduction timing, and also plots employment of
Arbeiter (hourly workers).
Part of the analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1984-
1989. In this section the standard hours variable is individual’s response to the question “What
are your collectively bargained weekly work hours without overtime?” (after the first survey,
the questionnaire specifies that if the respondent has more than one job, that s/he should refer
to the main job). The survey also asks respondents who are not working at the same job as in
the previous interview questions that seek to establish why the
used these responses to identify which job changes occurred
respondent changed jobs. I have
involuntarily (i.e. were fires or
layoffs). This is inherently somewhat subjective, relies on accurate reporting by respondents,
and assumes the quit/layoff distinction is meaningful. Therefore I also conduct analysis
assuming all separations are potentially involuntary.
When working with the individual data I focus on full-time workers (not possible in the
industry data), and hence drop respondents who said they had less than 35 standard hours. I
also drop workers who said their standard hours were greater than 45, to remove the most
obvious outliers (standard hours for all included industries were 40 or less throughout the sample
period). I drop workers in fishing, agriculture, or private households, and the self-employed,
12for whom standard hours are not well-defined. I drop workers aged 550r over, since during
the period under consideration special agreements were reached insome industries to reduce the
hours ofolder workers below those ofothers in the same industry or to allow early retirement.
Ialsodrop those doing apprenticeships mdthoseunderage2O, although they could arguably
be included. Finally, I drop those with missing actual or standard (agreed) hours, industry, firm
size, job type (self-employed, salaried etc), education, wage or job change information. Figure
4 shows the transformation in standard hours for 1984-89 as reported by manufacturing workers
in this sample.
Industry Level Results
The regressions using industry data are estimated using fixed effects. They include
month dummies interacted with dummies for ten aggregate industries to control for seasonal
patterns and are corrected for serial correlation of the errors with the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure. In addition to controlling for standard hours in the regressions, I control for sales
in each industry. This may be viewed as controlling for demand or, since sales and output are
closely related, for the scale effect. Including sales should control for endogeneity of
introduction of lower standard hours: if employers in industries expecting booms conceded lower
standard hours, this could lead to a negative sign on standard hours in an employment regression
(although a priori the endogeneity could go the other way). Thus specifications controlling for
sales should be free of bias due to endogenous hours reductions, unless industries introducing
lower standard hours were those expecting the capital to labor ratio to change in a particular
13direction, which does not seem compelling. Notice that if the more flexible use of hours caused
a positive scale effect, this too will be controlled for.
Results will be presented both controlling for wages and omitting wages. Some
component of changes in wages is part of the German work-sharing experiment, and the
coefficient on standard hours with wages omitted is of interest. The counterfactual of unchanged
wages is also of some interest, however, to get an idea of what might happen when standard
hours are reduced in an institutional setting where wages might behave differently. *
Table 1 presents results of regressions omitting wages. The dependent variable of the
first column is the log of Arbeiter (hourly-paid workers) at the end of the month. The
coefficient on standard hours is negative and significant, with a magnitude indicating that a one
hour reduction in standard hours would increase employment by 0.3 %. If confidence is placed
in the theoretical prediction of a negative scale effect, and controlling for sales controls for the
scale effect, then this result is an upper bound on the beneficial impact on employment of
standard hours reductions. The net effect may even have been negative. Increased flexibility of
hours could play a role, but
Flexibility presumably does
is urdikely to be introducing a bias towards pessimistic results.
not cause substitution away from labor services; the effect on
substitution between hours per worker and workers is unclear, but it is unlikely that flexibility
reduced substitution from hours per worker substantially, since we shall see below that this
substitution seems to be close to its theoretical maximum.
The second column examines the effect of standard hours on the total hours worked by
Arbeiter over the month (worker-hours). The coefficient on standard hours is large and positive,
indicating that a one hour reduction in standard hours reduced worker-hours by 2,1%. If the
14coefficient is also picking up substitution toward labor services due to increased hours flexibility,
the fall due to standard hours reductions alone would be more than 2.1%.
The third column uses the ratio of worker-hours and workers to construct hours per
worker (for Arbeiter), in order to see whether the effect of standard hours appears to be the
same in the industry data as in the individual data of Hunt (1996). The coefficient suggests that
a one hour fall in standard hours reduced hours per worker by 2.5%. The individual level result
of Hunt (1996) was that a full-time worker’s typical work week fell by 0.85-1 hour when
standard hours fell one hour, or a 2.1-2.4 % fall. The industry and individual data are thus fairly
consistent. The coefficients on standard hours are fairly consistent across the three measures of
Arbeiter labor inputs: a reduction of 2.5% in hours per worker (column 3) coupled with a rise
of 0.3 % in employment (column 1) implies a reduction in worker-hours of about 2.2%, close
to the 2.1% estimated in column 2.
No data on worker-hours for Angestellten (salaried workers) are available, but the
dependent variable of the fourth column is the log of Angestellten employed at the end of the
month. The coefficient on standard hours suggests that reducing standard hours by one hour
raised employment of Angestellten by 0.2 %, similar to the effect found for Arbeiter. The
individual level data used in Hunt (1996) suggested that actual hours for Angestellten fell about
one for one with standard hours, although these results were not as reliable as those for Arbeiter
(Hunt 1996). Together with the results of column 4 this implies a large fall in Angestellten
worker-hours, as for Arbeiter.
Thus for both Arbeiter and Angestellten, employment may have risen in response to a
one hour reduction in standard hours, by 0.2-0.3 %, implying an elasticity of about -0.06 to
15-0.10. This is on the low end of the range found by the existing literature. This employment
rise had a considerable cost in terms of lost worker-hours, which fell by 2.1% in response to
a one hour standard hour reduction, an elasticity of 0.84.
However, since hourly wages are known from the results of Hunt (1996) to have risen
when standard hours fell, the impact on the wage bill will be much less than on worker-hours,
and could even be positive. If the wage bill rises, the group of workers that decided to reduce
standard hours will be better off as a group even if some of them lose their job, and if
redistribution occurred (for example through the union) each member of the group could be
better off. Unions are sometimes modelled as wage-bill maximizers. Columns 5 and 6 examine
the influence of standard hours on the wage bills of Arbeiter and Angestellten, and the
coefficients on standard hours are negative and significant. The rises of 2.7 % (for Arbeiter) and
3.9 % (for Angestellten) associated with a one hour reduction in standard hours seem large in
light of the results of Hunt (1996), which found that straight-time hourly wages rose 2-3%.
Table 2 adds the indices of collectively bargained wages for Arbeiter and Angestellten
to the regressions of Table 1, The coefficients on the added variables do not always have the
expected signs: in particular, the coefficients on the two wage variables are essentially the same
in the Arbeiter regression as in the Angestellten regression. It is thus not entirely clear what is
being captured by the wage variables. The coefficients on standard hours are less significant
than in Table 1, but generally paint a less optimistic picture. This is unexpected, since
controlling for what is thought to be a wage rise should make standard hours reductions look
better for employment. The coefficient for Angestellten changes sign to become significant and
positive, indicating that reducing standard hours by one hour reduced employment by 0.2%.
16Thesign changes for Arbeiter too, although thecoefficient is insignificant. The coefficient in
the regression for worker-hours becomes small and insignificant (this change is in the expected
direction). Finally, the coefficient on hours per worker falls. The results for worker-hours and
hours per worker could have the interpretation that some of their fall in response to reductions
in standard hours was in fact due to the accompanying wage rise.
Table
average level
3 presents the results of weighted regressions. Regressions are weighted by the
of the dependent variable, with the exception of the hours per worker regression,
which is weighted by average number of Arbeiter. The weighted regressions have the advantage
that means are close to the means across workers. However, if the correct unit of analysis is
in fact the firm, and aggregation has uncertain effects, it may not be an improvement to down-
weight observations on small industries. Weighting increases the contribution to the estimates
of the large industries that struck in 1984 under IG Metall, and therefore provides an indication
as to whether the strike could be influencing the results.
The results are qualitatively similar to the unweighed results, although the magnitudes
of the standard hours coefficients differ, especially for Arbeiter worker-hours and the wage bills,
where the coefficients are considerably smaller and larger, respectively. The results of this table
suggest that a one hour fall in standard hours leads to
Angestellten and a 0.14 % rise in employment of Arbeiter.
The regressions presented so far have not taken into
a 0.26 % rise in employment of
account the fact that in some cases
firms might anticipate reductions in standard hours, since these were often known in advance,
nor that, particularly in cases where reductions took effect immediately they were agreed, the
firms might need some time to respond. The regressions of Table 4 add to the regressors six
17leads and six lags of standard hours, and the sum of all the standard hours coefficients,
representing the steady-state effect, is reported. The results of these (unweighed) regressions
are similar to the regressions of Table 1 including only current standard hours, although the
standard hours “coefficient” is larger, most notably for the Arbeiter regression. Hence a one
hour reduction in standard hours is associated with a 2.7 % fall in Arbeiter worker-hours, a 0.7 %
rise in Arbeiter employment, and a 0.3 % rise in Angestellten employment. The implied
elasticity for Arbeiter, -0.26, is still lower than those estimated in the time-series literature.
These results and those of Table 1 are preferred to the specifications including wages or using
weighting.
A final set of results based on data for 1990-1994 is presented in Table 5. This period
is not as good for the purposes of this study, since a widespread move to begin cutting hours
between mid- 1989 and mid- 1990 means that all industries have falling standard hours. The
effect of interest is thus identified from differing rates of the fall in standard hours. Also, the
last years of the data seem to be of poorer quality, and 8% of the observations are missing for
the period 1990-1994. Table 5 does not provide evidence that cuts in standard hours increase
employment, g
The specification that has shown the most beneficial effects of standard hours reductions
is the coefficient of -0.0066 in the Arbeiter equation using leads and lags (column 1 of Table
4). Average standard hours in the sample fell 1.7 hours from 1984 to 1989, so this coefficient
implies a 1.1% employment gain due to work-sharing. Compared to the growth in
manufacturing employment of 5.2% from 1984-89 this is significant, although not large.
However, perhaps a better comparison is with the level of employment growth that was hoped
18for over this period. Employment in the U.S. grew 11.6% and the employment to population
ratio grew 7.3 % (compared to 3.2% in Germany). Clearly, the employment growth achieved
in Germany through work-sharing is not close to bridging the German-American employment
growth gap. Furthermore, the large associated reductions in worker-hours suggest that the
standard hours reductions introduced a serious distortion and may have resulted in considerable
output loss.
Individual Level Results
Table 6 presents results from the GSOEP on the probability of a worker separating
involuntarily from the current job. A fixed effects conditional logit specification is used. The
regressors include year dummies, the current wage, current standard hours (as reported by the
respondent), and expected standard hours for the following year, to allow workers to anticipate
announced changes. Expected standard hours are calculated by averaging
responses in the following year of those in the individual’s current industry
the standard hours
and job type. The
results are similar (i.e. the coefficient is also insignificant) if expected standard hours are based
on published sources. Industry dummies are not generally included as, surprisingly, the
hypothesis that their coefficients were jointly zero could only be rejected in one regression.
Arbeiter in services and Angestellten in manufacturing are not broken out separately, as too few
separations identify the coefficients of interest. Manufacturing for the individual data does not
include construction, for consistency with the industry data.
For Arbeiter in all industries grouped together, the coefficient on standard hours is
positive and significant, suggesting a 7% decline in the probability of involuntary separation. 10
19Since theprobability ofaninvoluntary separation is 4.2% for this group, aone hour reduction
in standard hours would reduce this probability to 3.8%, raising employment by about 0.3 %
(ignoring any effect on hires, of course). This falls within the range found using industry data.
If the effect on hires is of a similar magnitude, the total effect would be similar to the largest
effect found with industry data. For other groups the coefficient on standard hours is
insignificant, except when the whole sample is used. The similarity of the coefficients for
Arbeiter in manufacturing, all Arbeiter, and the whole sample suggests that reducing standard
hours has similar employment effects in services and manufacturing.
Expected standard hours always has an insignificant coefficient. Insofar as the coefficient
for Arbeiter in manufacturing is insignificant, these results do not accord with the industry level
data for manufacturing. Even for this group, the number of separations that identi~ the
coefficient is not large, however. Notice that the wage variable has a negative sign, and is
hence probably capturing information about how the firm values the individual, rather than a
labor demand story about how the firm responds to exogenous union wage increases.
If the regressions are rerun with the probability of any type of separation as the
dependent variable, the results are similar in terms of significance, but coefficients are smaller.
Conclusions
Using manufacturing data on 201 detailed industries for 1984-89, I find that reductions
in standard hours were associated with rises in employment. I find that, in the preferred
specifications, a one hour fall in standard hours raised employment of hourly workers (Arbeiter)
by 0,3-0. 7% and employment of salaried workers (Angestellten) by 0.2-0.3%. However, I find
20that worker-hours
in standard hours.
of hourly workers (Arbeiter) fell by 2-3% in response to a one hour reduction
These results are conditional on sales, which removes endogeneity associated
with the adoption of lower standard hours, but may to some extent control for the scale effect,
expected to be negative. Hence, the employment rises may be upper bounds and the worker-
hours fall a lower bound. The implied elasticities for employment are at the low end of the
range in the existing literature on work-sharing, and the implied growth in employment of at
most 1.1% (in response to a 1.7 hour reduction in mean standard hours) is small compared with
growth in U.S. employment over the same period.
Due to a rise in straight-time hourly wages, the wage bill actually rose in conjunction
with reduced standard hours, despite reduced worker-hours, for both Arbeiter and Angestellten.
This indicates that workers as a group benefited from hours reductions.
The employment results from industry level data are supported by analysis of the
probability of an involuntary separation in the individual level Socio-Economic Panel data, For
Arbeiter in manufacturing and services together a one hour reduction in standard hours reduced
the probability of an involuntary separation by 7%, a magnitude which would imply an
employment rise of 0.3 %, similar to the industry-level results. For Angestellten standard hours
had no significant effect on separations.
Industry-level results for the period
employment fell when standard hours fell.
1990-1994 are more pessimistic, and suggest that
Although this period, when standard hours were
falling in all industries, is less suitable for study, these results do caution that employment
outcomes could be different in different economic environments.
21The good news from the first phase of Germany’s work-sharing experiment is thus that
employment rose, and that the wage bill increased. The bad news is that employment did not
rise enough to bring the German employment growth rate close to the American rate, and the
large fall in worker-hours indicates that an important distortion was introduced, which may have
caused loss of output.
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25Notes
1. European Industrial Relations Review November 1983.
2. Under the old system, a worker working more than eight hours in any given day was entitled to
overtime, as is the case currently in California. Generally in the United States the forty weeklyhours
may be spread in any way across the week with no obligation to pay overtime, and the new German
agreements allow for even longer windows.
3. A large literature documents the implementation of standard hours reductions. See, for example,
Bosch (1990), Bosch et. al. (1988), Bosch and Lehndorff (n.d.), European Industrial Relations Review
(various issues), Stille (1995), WSI-A4itleilungen (various issues).
4. For theoretical examinations of work-sharing, see Booth and Ravallion (1993), Booth and Schiantarelli
(1987), Calmfors (1985), Freeman (1995), Hart (1987), and Konig and Pohlmeier (1988).
5. To see this, write the ratio of the marginal costs, and take the derivative of this with respect to the
wage:
MCN a—
“h - 1 — -
* (1+p)2w2N2
([h+p(h-h,)](l +p)wN- [Wh+f+pw(h-h.)l(l+p)q
This is less than zero if f>0.
6. See Calmfors (1985), Heel (1987) and Houpis (1993) for theoretical analysis of the response of wages
to cuts in standard hours.
7. A small number of industries (five) have data missing in some years - they are excluded from the
figure so as not to make patterns look artificially jerky.
8. Like changes in standard hours, changes in wages cause a scale effect, and this will to some extent be
proxied for by sales in both specifications.
9. A possible explanation of why results for the 90s seem less optimistic than results for the 80s as
follows. Industries with more variable sales may be those who reduced standard hours earliest and most
if employers were keen to gain hours flexibility. If these industries also have larger business cycle
swings, they may have had greater employment rises in the upturn of the 80s, and greater losses in the
more uncertain early 90s. In this case the 80s results are overly optimistic
10. The elasticity representing the effect of h, on P(OT > O)is calculated































































The dependent variables are in logs. Arbeiter (hourly-paid workers) and Angestellten
(salaried workers) are measured at the end of the month, worker-hours and wage bills are
totals for the month. Hours per worker is the ratio of (Arbeiter) worker-hours and Arbeiter.
Data are monthly, for 1984-89.
Estimation is by fixed effects. Where a value for P is reported, serial correlation has been
corrected for using iterative Cochrane-Orcutt. The average of the industry-specific p‘s is
reported. The Durbin Watson test refers to the uncorrected results.
27Table 2: The Effect of Standard Hours on Labor Inputs, With Wages as Covariates
II Labor services
Arbeiter (hourly-paid workers) Angestellen
(salaried
Arbeiter Worker- Hours per workers)
hours worker
Standud hours 0.0009 0.0023 0.0098 0.0021
(0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0009)
Sales (log) 0.031 0.278 0.138 0.011
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Arbeiter wage (log) 0.187 -0.107 -0.263 0.196
(0.039) (O.126) (0.083) (0.037)
Angestellten wage -0.245 -0.327 0.076 -0.251
(log) (0.040) (O.127) (0.083) (0.038)




Durbin- Watson I 0.27 I 0.79 I 1.66 I 0.22
p (mean Ofpi) 0.94 0.49 -- 0.93
(0.04) (0. 10) (0.04)
N,T I 201,72
Notes:
a. The dependent variables are in logs. Arbeiter (hourly-paid workers) and Angestellten
(salaried workers) are measured at the end of the month, worker-hours is the total for
month. Hours per worker is the ratio of (Arbeiter) worker-hours and Arbeiter.
b. The wage is the log of the collectively bargained wage.
c. Data are monthly, for 1984-89.
the
d. Estimation is by fixed effects. Where a value for p is reported, serial correlation has been
corrected for using iterative Cochrane-Orcutt. The average of the industry-specific p‘s is
reported. The Durbin Watson test refers to the uncorrected results.
28Table 3: Results of Weighted Regressions
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a. The dependent variables are in logs.
b. Data are monthly, for 1984-89.
c. Estimation is by fixed effects. Where a value for P is reported, serial correlation has been
corrected for using iterative Cochrane-Orcutt. The average of the industry-specific p‘s is
reported. The Durbin Watson test refers to the uncorrected results.
d. Regressions are weighted by the average over the period of the dependent variable (in levels).
(For hours per worker the weight is the average number of Arbeiter.)






















































The dependent variables are in logs.
The covariates include six leads and lags of standard hours. The sum of the coefficients on
the leads, lags and contemporaneous variables are reported.
Data are monthly, for 1984-89.
Estimation is by fixed effects. Where a value for p is reported, serial correlation has been
corrected for using iterative Cochrane-Orcutt. The average of the industry-specific p‘s is
reported. The Durbin Watson test refers to the uncorrected results.
30Table 5: Results of Regressions for 1990-1994
Labor services Wage bills
Arbeiter (hourly-paid workers) Angestell- Arbeiter Angestell-
ten
Arbeiter Worker- Hours (sa~ried
hours per workers)
worker
Standard 0.0045 0.1014 0.0084 0.0062 0,044
hours
-0.032
(0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.002) (0.002)
Sales (log) 0.031 0.252 0.145 0.026 0.142 0.060
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)




Durbin- 0.38 0.66 1.47 0.37 0,91 0.82
Watson





(0. 13) (0.05) (0.11) (o. 10)
N,T 201,60
Notes:
a. The dependent variables are in logs.
b. Data are monthly, for 1990-94.
c. Estimation is by fixed effects. Where a value for p is reported, serial correlation has been
corrected for using iterative Cochrane-Orcuti. The average of the industry-specific p‘s is
reported. The Durbin Watson test refers to the uncorrected results.
d. Regressions are weighted by the average over the period of the dependent variable (in levels).
(For hours per worker the weight is the average number of Arbeiter.)
31Table6: The Effect of Shndard Hours ontie Probability of Involunt~ Separation
Arbeiter (hourly) Angestellten (salaried) All
Manufact- All Services All All
uring
Standard hours 0.215 0.191 -0.235 0.090 0.149
(0.206) (0.094) (0.233) (o. 143) (0.072)
Expected 0.985 -0,417 0.067 0.120 -0.086
standard hours (0.939) (0.303) (0.824) (0.500) (0.237)
following year
Wage (log) -1.358 -0.818 -0.583 -0.296 -0.600
(1.196) (0.527) (0.949) (0.687) (0.396)
Year dummies? yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies? yes no no no no
N*T (total ohs) 5015 7362 2952 4656 12018
N (cross-section) 1732 2685 1127 1768 4453
Mean of dependent 0.034 0.042 0.038 0.032 0.038
variable
Notes:
1. Individual level data from GSOEP for 1984-1988.
2. Estimation is fixed effects conditional logit.
3. Expected standard hours in the following year is the average in the following year of standard
hours responses in the individual’s current industry and job type.
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